This particular date prompts some deep thoughts every year. Seventy-three years ago today the U.S. used an atomic bomb against the Japanese city of Hiroshima. This year, the anniversary comes shortly after a trip that has led to my month-long immersion in history of the World War I and Korean War eras. Perhaps I can share with you some of what I learned in the past couple of weeks, learnings that have lent context to my understanding of what took place on August 6, 1945.
The war in the Pacific and Asia was a much messier and asynchronous experience than I knew. American troops were executing essentially two campaigns across the Pacific, one led by the Navy, the other by the Army. Meanwhile British (and colonial) troops were fighting a war in southeast Asia that didn't coordinate much at all with American actions in the Pacific. Then there was the land war in China in which Japanese forces were up against Nationalist and Communist forces, groups which certainly weren't coordinating with one another. Though America had allies, it often seemed like they were fighting independently, especially given that their allies' objectives were ambivalent.
And by 1945, most of those allies' will to continue fighting had waned considerably. Both Nationalists and Communists in China were positioning themselves for the power struggle to come after the Japanese defeat. War-weary Britain was fighting for uncertain goals in southeast Asia, reclaiming colonies that might not remain colonies. Australians' support for the war had greatly diminished in the last year or so as they were relegated to mop up roles behind the advancing American forces. Soviet Russia did not join until the last minute.
An invasion of the Home Islands was not a foregone conclusion had America not used the bombs or if the bombs had been insufficient to motivate the Japanese to seek peace. Many of the key stakeholders drafting those plans did so with the expectation the plans wouldn't actually be used. There's reason to believe the U.S. would have settled for an indefinite delay of the invasion and relied on bombers and the navy to continue suffocating Japan. In that case, it's possible the war could've lasted an interminably long time and maybe even end in an unsatisfying armistice like that which ended the Korean War.
Leaders, military and political, are often captive to decisions made long ago in circumstances that don't match the current reality. The B-29 and atomic bombs are good examples of this. It took some time for the U.S. to figure out how to use the improbably sophisticated B-29, a bomber conceived really for the war in Europe. And the atomic bomb's development was initiated in an attempt to beat the Nazis to this hideous device. Once the bases existed to use the B-29, once the B-29s were in place, and once the bombs were available, there really wasn't much reason for the leadership at that time to not use it.
I don't mean for the above points to be complete or profound. But a month of reading about the era has given me a chance to learn more that sets President Truman's decision into context. And though nothing has really moved me to change my mind about that decision, I appreciate having the additional shadings of fact and analysis to help me understand that decision.
